Since the general consensus around Houston seems to be that the Tim Purpura firing was justified, I thought it might be a good idea to present an alternate view, that of Joe Sheehan from the Baseball Prospectus.
Firing Purpura, as McLane did yesterday, is an act of incompetence. Not only was it Purpura’s work–he ran the Astros’ player-development operations for seven years prior to becoming GM–that built the pennant winner, but with the expensive problems he inherited and the meddling of McLane, it was impossible for him to move the Astros in the direction they needed to go. He was essentially a caretaker, needing to preside over a rebuilding process and never being allowed to do so, and he’s now out of a job largely because his employer has returned to being completely irrational about what his team is.
Purpura’s performance as a GM was a mixed bag. He made his share of missteps, such as the [Willy] Taveras trade and the Woody Williams contract. However, he showed a terrific ability for making the smaller moves that add value at very little cost. In three seasons, Purpura made something-for-nothing pickups such as Mike Lamb, Aubrey Huff, and Mark Loretta. The player-development program he built continues to generate contributors such as Luke Scott, Wandy Rodriguez (check out his peripherals this year), Chad Qualls, and Troy Patton. If left to his own devices, I have no doubt that Purpura would have limited the Astros’ rebuilding process to a few short seasons, and come out on the other side with a team prepared for a long run of success.
Instead, he’s out of a job. Tim Purpura isn’t to blame for the Astros’ disappointing 2007 season, and that he’s being fired for it is ridiculous. Drayton McLane set these events in motion by abandoning what had worked for close to a decade–staying out of the baseball staff’s way–and instead making his own bad decisions about what the Astros needed. McLane wanted a year-long coronation of Craig Biggio, and he got it. He couldn’t have that and a contending baseball team, however, and his refusal to see that–and his subsequent dismissal of Purpura and Phil Garner as scapegoats for his own mistakes–ranks as one of the game’s great embarrassments of 2007.
Much the same sentiment is expressed by Tom Kirkendall, though he is more understanding of the move. So there you have it.
UPDATE: And Sheehan’s colleague Nate Silver makes the case against Purpura.
I think we can break the general manager’s job into three broad compartments, those being (i) scouting and development; (ii) transactionally-based talent evaluation and analysis, and (iii) interpersonal and intraorganizational skills. And I think Purpura comes up short in each of those departments.
In the scouting realm, the Astros ranked 22nd of 30 teams in PECOTA’s analysis of minor league talent, 28th in Kevin Goldstein’s ranking of the same, and dead last in PECOTA’s rankings of the overall 25-and-under talent stock. The Astros have had a handful of player development successes, but their system is poor enough to be past that tipping point where the option of a quick-turnaround rebuilding effort is largely off the table.
In the talent evaluation realm, Purpura’s highest-stakes transactions – the nine-figure signing of Carlos Lee, and the Jason Jennings deal – grade out badly (indeed, this is not merely perfect hindsight; they were viewed skeptically at the time). The Astros can also be blamed for their inaction in a number of areas, whether it’s failing to offer Roger Clemens arbitration, or allowing run vacuum Brad Ausmus to retain his hold on the catching position.
The intrapersonal skills category is the hardest to evaluate without inside knowledge, and the one where Purpura deserves the most sympathy. Meddling owners like Drayton McLane are almost always counterproductive. It isn’t uncommon to see owners block trades, or to be willing to open up the purse strings for some free agents but not for others, but it’s extremely unusual to see the owner essentially jump two levels down and interfere with the job of the field manager, as McLane looks to have done by mandating that Craig Biggio play every day until he reached 3,000 hits. This is terrible from an organizational culture standpoint; Purpura’s ability to manage Phil Garner was undermined by McLane’s insistence on doing the same.
At the same time, the general manager’s job is not just about managing one’s subordinates, but also managing one’s superiors. If we make the favorable assumption toward Purpura, which is that he was not on board with the decision to play Craig Biggio every day, we also have to assume that he was unable to persuade McLane of his case. Certainly, we cannot know how many general managers would have fared differently, but we nevertheless have to regard this as sort of a “tough love” indictment of Purpura. I happen to think that the battle might have been unwinnable, but the war was not: if Purpura had been able to articulate (literally and figuratively) a better long-term vision for the franchise, then the downside to playing Biggio would have seemed more tangible.
I think that’s about all I’ve got on this subject. Moving on…